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RECLAIMING SKEPTICISM: LESSONS FROM
GUANTANAMO
Heidi Kitrossert
3. What are the lessons from detaining non-U.S. citizens, labeled enemy
combatants, at Gitmo?
INTRODUCTION
Learned Hand famously defined "the spirit of liberty" as "the
spirit which is not too sure that it is right."' Hand's statement
reflects the integral role of skepticism in our national identity.
From its conception, the United States has justified and defined its
existence through its embrace of liberty. Throughout, it has
deemed liberty inextricable from skepticism-from the vigilance of
a people who do not merely take their government at its word, but
who oversee it and dissent from its actions when necessary. Indeed,
James Madison observed in the constitutional ratification debates
that we need to have government in the first place and to divide
and check that government's powers because human beings are no
"angels."2
Of course, skepticism-though embedded in our political and
constitutional frameworks-is in sharp tension with other cultural
pressures and impulses. Among the latter forces are those
militating toward strong, even complete, deference to the President
and his subordinates on national security matters in times of war or
terror. Such deference takes myriad forms. These forms include
congressional consent to executive-branch programs about which
Congress has been told little to judicial dismissal of cases against
the Government when it asserts that litigation would reveal state
t Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. Judge Learned Hand, Address at the I Am an American Day ceremony
(May 21, 1944), available at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/ENews/2002e67?opendocument (last visited
Mar. 31, 2009).
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secrets. The reasons for deference range from genuine fear that it
might be dangerous for the executive branch to reveal information
to anyone-even a federal judge or select members of Congress-
outside of a small circle; to fear of political and social repercussions
that may follow from pushing the executive branch to make
disclosures that they deem dangerous; to a simple desire to avoid
the responsibility that comes with knowledge. As former Senate
Armed Services Committee Chairman John Stennis once
reportedly told former CIA director James Schlesinger: 'Just go
ahead and do it, but I don't want to know!"
3
The tension between these competing political and legal
modes-skepticism and oversight on the one hand, deference to
executive-branch decisions on the other-are cast in sharp relief by
the detention, in recent years, of hundreds of alleged unlawful
enemy combatants at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay. The
President and other executive-branch officers championed
deference. They assured the country that those detained at
Guantanamo were "the worst of the worst," hardened terrorists who
had engaged in hostile actions against the United States and who
were determined to "return to the battlefield" at their first• 4
opportunity. Relying on the notion that detainees had been
captured "on the battlefield," the executive branch argued that the
Guantanamo detentions were products of military decision making
into which Congress and the courts should not intrude. 5 Critics of
the detention system did not dispute, of course, that individuals
who truly threaten the United States should be detained. Rather,
they argued that long-term detention could not, consistent with our
constitutional system and its deep grounding in skepticism, stem
solely from one person's or one group's unchecked say-so.6
Events as of the time of this essay's writing-late November of
2008-provide a unique vantage point from which to consider the
Guantanamo Bay detentions and the lessons to be drawn from
them. On the one hand, the new President-elect pledges to close
Guantanamo Bay and to try the remaining detainees in the United
States. On the other hand, it is far from clear at this point what
3. DENIS MCDONOUGH ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, No MERE OVERSIGHT:
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE IS BROKEN 9 (2006),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2006/09/no-mere-oversight.pdf.
4. See infra notes 8-9.
5. See infra notes 9-11.
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form these trials will take and how they will address the many
problems-including the existence of evidence gleaned through
torture and the need for some evidence to remain secret-that
might surface as they proceed. Furthermore, we now have a fair
amount of information and experience regarding the detention
process of the last several years, including several court cases
challenging it, and some limited data on the detainees.
This short essay draws on this information to assess
Guantanamo as a case study in the struggle between skepticism on
the one hand and pressure to defer to executive judgment on the
other. It relies heavily on data obtained and analyzed in a series of
tremendously important reports (hereinafter, collectively, "the
Denbeaux findings")' by Mark Denbeaux of Seton Hall University
School of Law, Joshua Denbeaux of Denbeaux & Denbeaux, and
their co-authors (hereinafter, "the Denbeaux team"). This essay
summarizes some of the dramatic contrasts between government
assertions-as to detainee characteristics, the circumstances of
detainee captures, and the adequacy of the process to challenge
detentions-and the Denbeaux findings. It also situates the
findings in the context of the legal claims made by the executive
branch to the effect that it had virtually no constitutional
obligation to justify its detentions, Congress's deference to these
claims, and the mixed record of the U.S. Supreme Court in
responding to the same. The essay concludes that Guantanamo
exemplifies the crucial nature of skepticism and oversight to
protect liberty and national security, the strong political and social
pressures toward deference, and the tools in our constitutional
system to push back against these pressures.
7. MARK DENBEAUX &JOSHUA DENBEAUX, THE GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: THE
GOVERNMENT'S STORY,
http://aw.shu.edu/news/guantanamo-reportfinal_2_08_06.pdf (last visited
Mar. 31, 2009) [hereinafter DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX, FIRST REPORT]; MARK P.
DENBEAUX ET AL., SECOND REPORT ON THE GUA.NTANAMO DETAINEES: INTER- AND
INTRA-DEPARTMENTAL DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT WHO IS OUR ENEMY,
http://law.shu.edu/news/second-reportguantanamo-detainees_3 20_final.pdf
(last visited Feb. 16, 2009) [hereinafter DENBEAUX ET AL., SECOND REPORT]; MARK
DENBEAUX ET AL., No-HEARING HEARINGS,
http://law.shu.edu/news/final nohearing-hearings-report.pdf (last visited Mar.
31, 2009) [hereinafter DENBEAUX ET AL., NO-HEARING HEARINGS]; MARK DENBEAUX
ET AL., THE MEANING OF "BATTLEFIELD": AN ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S
REPRESENTATIONS OF "BATTLEFIELD" CAPTURE AND "RECIDIVISM" OF THE GUANTAINTAMO
DETAINEES, http://law.shu.edu/news/meaningofbattlefield final_121007.pdf
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EXECUTIVE CLAIMS ABOUT DETAINEES AND THE PROCESS DUE
The Bush administration repeatedly assured the public that
the detainees at Guantanamo Bay were the "worst of the worst,""
terrorists who had been caught red-handed "on the battlefield." 9
More precisely, it deemed the detainees unlawful enemy
combatants who could be detained for the duration of a military
conflict with no process beyond their initial labeling as unlawful
enemy combatants. Indeed, the administration argued that no
further process was constitutionally due to anyone deemed an
unlawful enemy combatant, even U.S. citizens who were captured
or detained in the United States.' ° As for aliens detained at
Guantanamo Bay (and thus outside the territorial limits of the
United States), the administration went further, arguing that the
Constitution not only grants them no such process right, but
accords them no right to have a federal judge consider the
question. " In short, the administration argued that the
Guantanamo detainees (and all others detained as unlawful enemy
combatants) could be detained indefinitely so long as the
administration claims that they are unlawful enemy combatants.
RESPONSES BY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESS
In 2004's Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,12 the Supreme Court settled
somewhere between deference and skepticism when it assessed the
process due those who wished to challenge their status as unlawful
enemy combatants. 3  While the Court spurned the Bush
8. DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX, FIRST REPORT, supra note 7, at 2-4; DENBEAUX ET
AL., SECOND REPORT, supra note 7, at 3.
9. DENBEAUX ET AL., THE MEANING OF "BATTLEFIELD," supra note 7, at 4-5.
10. See, e.g., Brief of Respondent, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)
(No. 03-6696); Brief of Petitioner, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No.
03-1027).
11. See, e.g., Brief of Respondent, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008)
(Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196).
12. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
13. See generally id. at 507. Hamdi considered the process due a U.S. citizen
captured abroad and detained in the United States. The Combatant Status Review
Tribunals (CSRTs) at Guantanamo, however, largely follow the process model
suggested by the Hamdi Court as detailed in the next paragraph of this essay. Of
course, the Guantanamo CSRTs are also responsive to the Supreme Court's
holding-handed down on the same day as Hamdi-that aliens detained at
Guantanamo Bay have a statutory right to habeas corpus. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466, 483-84 (2004). The Court did not decide until four years later that the
Guantanamo detainees also have a constitutional right to the same. Boumediene,
5070 [Vol. 35:5
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administration's claim that its say-so was the only process due, it
concluded that alleged unlawful combatants did not have to be
tried in U.S. civilian courts or through well-established courts
martial. It granted the executive wide leeway to craft processes to
give detainees "a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker."14 It suggested that
military commissions lacking the process protections of U.S. courts
could suffice. 15
The Hamdi Court's analysis laid the groundwork for the
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) adopted by the
Pentagon shortly after the Hamdi decision. 6 The CSRTs are three-
person military commissions charged with determining, by majority
vote under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, whether
detainees are correctly deemed unlawful enemy combatants."7 The
Pentagon's rules provide, among other things, that the
Government's evidence is presumed genuine and accurate subject
to rebuttal; that CSRTs are "not bound by the rules of evidence, ,19
such as would apply in a court of law"; that each detainee shall be
appointed a Personal Representative (PR) to assist him in the
process; that the PR is not an advocate for the detainee, does not
have a confidential relationship with the detainee, and may be
required to disclose information about the detainee to the CSRT;2°
and that the detainee may present evidence that the CSRT deems
relevant, including the testimony of witnesses deemed "reasonably
21available" by the CSRT.
Congress adopted a posture of strong deference toward the
executive with respect to the CSRTs. The 2005 Detainee
Treatment Act (DTA) essentially codified the CSRTs by leaving
their details largely to the Pentagon." The DTA also does not
128 S. Ct. at 2240.
14. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
15. Id. at 533-34, 538.
16. See supra note 13.
17. Memorandum from Gordon England, Sec'y of the Navy, Implementation
on Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants
Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba (July 29, 2004) at enclosure 1, §
(G) (11)-(12), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf.
18. Id. at enclosure 1, § (G)(11).
19. Id. at enclosure 1, § (G)(7).
20. Id. at enclosure 3, §§ (B)(1), (C)(1), (5)-(8), (D).
21. Id. at enclosure 1, §§ (F) (6), (G) (9)-(10).
22. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, 119
2009] 5071
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prevent the use of statements obtained through torture. It provides
only that CSRTs "shall, to the extent practicable, assess" whether a
statement was derived through "coercion" and "the probative value
(if any) of any such statement." Congress also limited the ability
of detainees to challenge their CSRT determinations in federal
courts. Under the DTA and the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA), detainees may only bring suit in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit on the ground that their CSRT determination
is inconsistent with the Pentagon's CSRT standards and procedures
or "to the extent the Constitution and the laws of the United States
are applicable, [that] the use of such standards and procedures to
make the determination is [in]consistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States."
24
Finally, the Supreme Court evinced skepticism in striking
down the statutory limits on judicial review under the
Constitution's Habeas Corpus Clause. Under the clause, prisoners
generally may petition courts to challenge the legality of their
detention absent congressional suspension of the writ.2' The Court
held that the statutory review restrictions unlawfully curtailed
habeas review without the requisite formal suspension of the writ.26
Among other things, the Court read the restrictions to prevent
detainees from presenting new evidence to the D.C. Circuit in its
exclusive review proceedings. 2' The Court explained that such a
right was particularly important for detainees appealing from the
relatively loose procedures of the CSRTs. 2" The Court also rejected
the administration's argument that the Habeas Corpus Clause does
not apply to the Guantanamo Bay detainees because they are aliens
detained outside of the United States. The Court em hasized the
practical control of Guantanamo by the United States.
THE DENBEAUX FINDINGS
The Denbeaux findings demonstrate the practical importance
of the struggle between deference and skepticism in the context of
Stat. 2680, 2740-41 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2006)).
23. Id. § 1005(b)(1).
24. Id. § 1005(e); Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-
366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (e)).
25. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
26. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008).
27. Id. at 2272.
28. Id. at 2272-74.
29. Id. at 2259-62.
5072 [Vol. 35:5
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the Guantanamo detainees. The findings betray the wide gap
between the Government's sweeping public characterizations of the
detainees as "the worst of the worst" who were captured on "the
battlefield" and the Government's allegations to the CSRTs. They
also illustrate the minimal nature of the process provided in the
CSRTs.
DETAINEE BACKGROUNDS
With respect to detainee characteristics, the Denbeaux
findings rely entirely on the Government's allegations in their
unclassified evidence summaries for the CSRTs. Based on the
more than 500 summaries to which they had access, the Denbeaux
team concludes, among other things, that:
" Fifty-fifty percent of the detainees were not
alleged to have committed a single hostile act
against the United States. 31 This is true despite
the Government's expansive definition of a
hostile act. For example, the Government
deemed a hostile act to have been committed
when it found that "1. [A] detainee fled, along
with others, when [U.S.] forces bombed their
camp. 2. The detainee was captured in
Pakistan, along with other Uighur fighters."
3 2
* All detainees (whether or not alleged to have
committed a hostile act) were accused by the
Government of having some affiliation with
either the Taliban or al Qaeda or "associated
forces engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners.,33 Seven percent
of the detainees were listed as affiliated with "al
Qaeda OR Taliban, indicating that the
Government had not determined which of the
two groups was the affiliate in each case. The
Government deemed 10% of "unidentified
affiliation" and 1% "other.,3 5 Levels of alleged
affiliation also varied widely. The Government
30. DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX, FIRST REPORT, supra note 7, at 5.
31. Id. at 6-7, 11.
32. Id. at 12.
33. Id. at 7.
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determined that 8% of detainees were alleged
to have been "fighters for" their affiliated
group, 30% were alleged to be "members" and
60% were labeled only "associated with" the
group. The Government used expansive
definitions of membership: "simply being told
that one had been selected as a member [in al
Qaeda] would qualify one as a member,"" and
one could become a member of the Taliban
through conscription."
" The Government deemed affiliation with any
one of 72 groups sufficient to make a detainee
an unlawful enemy combatant. Fifty-two of the
groups "are not on either the [PATRIOT] Act
Terrorist Exclusion List or on two separate
State Department Designated and Other
Foreign Terrorist Organization lists."3 9
* Ninety-three percent of the detainees were not
40alleged to have been captured by U.S. forces.
"The United States promised (and apparently
paid) large sums of money for the capture of
persons identified as enemy combatants in,,. 41
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
* No more than 21, or 4%, of the 516 summaries
reviewed "alleged that a detainee had ever been
on any battlefield. " 42 Only one detainee was
alleged to have been captured on a battlefield
by U.S. forces.43
THE CSRT PROCESS IN PRACTICE
The Denbeaux team also reviewed Defense Department
reports, most of which were released under judicial order," that
document CSRTs conducted at Guantanamo Bay. The team had
36. Id. at 9.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 10.
39. DENBEAUX ET AL., SECOND REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
40. DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX, FIRsT REPORT, supra note 7, at 14.
41. Id. at 15.
42. DENBEAUX ET AL., THE MEANING OF "BATTLEFIELD," supra note 7, at 4.
43. Id.
44. DENBEAUX ET AL., NO-HEARING HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 2, 4.
5074 [Vol. 35:5
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access to records from CSRT hearings for 393 detainees, 45 although
they had access to complete records for only 102 of those
detainees. The Denbeaux findings include the following:
* The Government did not "present a single
witness at any of the 393 CSRT hearings.
Instead it relied almost exclusively on the
secret, and presumptively valid, classified
evidence. 47
* The Government typically provided detainees
only with the unclassified, conclusory summary
of the evidence against them. 48 Although the
full CSRT records indicate that the
Government presented some unclassified
evidence beyond the summary in 48% of the
hearings, 49 only 4% of detainees had access to
that information prior to their hearings5° and
only 7% were shown it during their hearings.
No detainee was shown the classified evidence
against him.52
* "[O]nly 26% of the detainees that requested
witnesses were able to get any of those witnesses
produced by the Tribunal.'51 Only 4% were
able to get all of their requested witnesses.
54
While "[m]ore than half of the detainees who
requested witnesses requested the testimony of
witnesses who were not at Guantanamo," all
such requests were denied.55 "Thus... the only
witnesses that any of the detainees were able to
produce to testify on their behalf were other
detainees.",
6
45. Id. at 4.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 19-20.
48. Id. at 21.
49. Id. at 22.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 30.
53. Id. at 27.
54. Id. at 27-28.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 29.
2009] 5075
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" "The promised CSRT process stated that
detainees would be allowed to produce
documentary evidence. In operation, the only
documentary evidence that detainees were
actually allowed to introduce were letters from
family and friends. This was true even when the
documentary evidence sought to be introduced
was available and, in fact, even when the
documents were in the Government's
possession-such as passports, hospital records,
and even judicial proceedings. In these cases,
the detainee insisted that the documents would
prove that the charges against him could not be
true, but none of the documents was permitted
to be introduced.,
57
" "No Tribunal apparently considered the extent
to which any hearsay evidence was obtained
through coercion.' 8
" "At least three detainees were initially found
not to be enemy combatants and then
subjected to multiple re-hearings [without
notice to them of their initial 'victories' or of
the re-hearings] until they were found to be
enemy combatants."'
59
* "[I]n 78% of the cases, the [detainee's PR] met
with the detainee only once. The meetings
were as short as 10 minutes, and this includes
time for translation. Some 13% of the meetings
were 20 minutes or less, and more than half of
the meetings lasted no more than an hour."60
The PR "was totally silent in 12% of the
hearings, and in only 52% of the hearings did
the personal representative make substantive
comments. However, sometimes the
substantive comments of the personal
representative advocated for the Government
57. Id. at 6.
58. Id. at 36.
59. Id. at 37.
60. Id. at 4.
5076 [Vol. 35:5
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and against the detainee.'
CONCLUSION
The Denbeaux findings illuminate the very real, very high
stakes in the struggle between deference and skepticism regarding
the Guantanamo detainees. The findings suggest, quite simply,
that the Government erred in its longstanding assurances that the
detainees were "the worst of the worst" and could be locked up for
years consistent with morality, law, and national security. These
errors are immeasurably costly, of course, to all who have been
wrongly detained. And they bear costs that we in the United States
have only begun to contemplate regarding our international
reputation and national security. Among the many problems that
the Guantanamo experience presents for the United States is the
possibility that truly dangerous persons may have to be released
because they were interrogated illegally at Guantanamo; the
potential that fair hearings will make widely transparent that many
innocents were wrongly held for years; and the possibility that the
experience at Guantanamo itself has radicalized prisoners or others
sympathetic to their plight.
All of this serves as a tragic reminder of a very simple insight at
the heart of our constitutional system: human beings are fallible
and a healthy skepticism of government is necessary to liberty and
security. Because this proposition is at our system's core, it is hardly
a surprise that a majority of the Supreme Court derived elements of
it from the Constitution. The Court did so when it concluded that
the military could not constitutionally evade oversight of long-term
detentions by locating detainees offshore or by declaring
detentions lawful.
For all of its tragedy, then, there are rays of hope in the
Guantanamo experience. The experience illuminates tools for self-
correction within our constitutional system. As of November
2008-in the wake of the Supreme Court's recent holding that62
detainees have a constitutional right to habeas corpus 6-federal
courts are reviewing habeas corpus petitions by detainees
challenging their CSRT determinations. Whistle-blowers within the
military have stepped forward over time to challenge the CSRTs
and other elements of the Guantanamo detentions that they
61. Id. at 6.
62. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240, 2262 (2008).
2009] 5077
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believe to be illegal. And public sentiment has evolved to the point
that both major presidential candidates in the 2008 election
pledged to close Guantanamo Bay.
Perhaps the most basic and most important lesson of
Guantanamo Bay is the reminder it provides us of the crucial role
that skepticism plays in our constitutional system. Certainly, as
events at Guantanamo reflect, it is human nature to want to put
skepticism aside and to rally around a reassuring leader in times of
terror or war. Yet as these events also reflect, such temptation
obscures the basic insight that humans are tremendously fallible
and ought not to be trusted, unchecked, with a people's liberty or
security. Because our Constitution is grounded in this basic
insight, it-and the cultural values that it reflects and fosters-
contains tools to help us right our paths when we stray too far from
skepticism and too close to the deceptive comforts of deference.
12
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